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Group incentive systems have to overcome the free rider or 1/N problem, which gives workers an
incentive to shirk, if they are to succeed. This paper uses new questions on responses to shirking from
the General Social Survey and a special NBER survey of workers at over 300 worksites in 14 companies
that have some form of group incentive pay to examine how well workers can monitor their peers
and what they do when the peers are not working up to speed.  The paper finds that: 1) most workers
say that they can detect fellow employees who shirk; 2) many report that they would speak to the shirker
or report the behavior or a supervisor, and many report that they did so in the past;  3) the proportion
that takes action against shirkers is greatest among workers paid under group incentive systems, in
smaller companies, and in companies with good employee-management relations; 4)  group incentives
interact with high-performance human resource policies such as employee involvement teams, training,
task variety, low levels of supervision, and good fixed wages to induce more workers to act against
shirking; 5) workers in workplaces where there is more anti-shirking behavior report that co-workers
work harder, encourage other workers more, and report that their workplace facility is more effective
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   What do workers do when they see someone slacking off in ways that reduce the 
productivity of their work group and enterprise? 
The rational response depends on the circumstances.  In a tournament race for promotion, 
having a competitor slack off is good news.  You don’t have to go all out to win the promotion.  
In a piece-rate pay system where the firm lowers the rate per piece when workers produce more 
than expected, you will also welcome the shirker.  The more other workers shirk, the less likely it 
is that management will lower the rate per piece and make it harder to earn your weekly pay. 
But when part of workers’ pay comes in the form of some group incentive such as profit-
sharing or share ownership or stock options, a worker who does not do his or her job takes 
“money out of the pocket” of other workers.  The group would be better off if someone acted 
against the shirker. But standard analysis suggests that it will rarely be rational for anyone to 
intervene.  The costs of intervening with the shirker fall on the intervener but that person gets 
only part of the benefit (in an N worker group the worker who intervenes gains 1/Nth of the 
benefit going to workers and none of the benefit that goes to capital).  The implication is that 
rational workers will not act against a shirker just as rational players should not cooperate in a 
prisoner’s dilemma game.  Group incentive systems are thus doomed to failure.  
The facts for labor practices as for prisoner’s dilemma and other games of cooperation 
are different. Team production and group incentive plans, which succeed only if they overcome 
free riding and shirking, are widespread in modern economies. Since workers often have better 
information than management on what fellow workers are doing, worker responses to shirking 
are critical to the success or failure of these schemes.  Many workplaces develop cultures where 
workers discourage others from shirking.  Lab experiments find cooperative behavior in  
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collective goods games when game theory rationality predicts that the rational player defects.  
Directly relevant to our analysis, Fehr and Gachter (2000) have found that individuals punish 
defectors in laboratory experiments even when it is not in their individual self-interest to do so, 
due to norms of reciprocity that are strong among many individuals.  Peer monitoring has also 
been found in group loans in Third World credit markets (Stiglitz 1990).  Punishing free riders at 
a workplace may also benefit the intervener in the long run if other members of the group 
appreciate that person’s action against free riders.  They may reap long term rewards in the form 
of higher esteem and greater influence within a group. Self-interest aside, the evidence from 
anthropologists that voluntarily “policing” cooperation occurs in many societies suggests that it 
may be hardwired from evolution. Some economists have suggested how ostracism can be 
effective in promoting cooperation (Hirshleifer and Rasmussen 2003). 
This study examines worker reactions to shirking by analyzing questions that we 
developed and put on the 2002 and 2006 General Social Surveys (GSS) and on surveys of 14 
companies that have some forms of group incentive plans that we conducted through the NBER.  
We asked workers about the ease of observing co-workers' performance, and the likelihood of 
responding to poor work performance.  Our analysis of these questions, together with questions 
about incentive systems, firm human resource policies, and other aspects of the workplace, show: 
1.  Most workers believe that they can readily detect shirking by fellow employees. 
2.  Workers are most likely to take action against shirkers in workplaces where 
employees are paid by some form of “shared capitalism” – by which we mean profit sharing, 
gain sharing, stock options, or other forms of ownership – and they participate in decisions or 
work in team settings.  
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3. Responses to these forms of group incentive pay are largest when they trust 
management and have good employee management relations, and when the firm adopts high-
performance human resource policies, low levels of supervision, and pays fixed wages at or 
above market levels along with the incentive pay.   
4.  Consistent with the theory of free riding, anti-shirking behavior is greater in smaller 
firms and is particularly strong in small firms with shared capitalist pay.  
5.  Workers in workplaces where there is more anti-shirking behavior report that co-
workers work harder, encourage other workers more, and report that their workplace facility is 
more effective in several dimensions related to productivity and profits. 
The bottom line is that “shared capitalist“ arrangements – defined broadly as those in 
which firms share rewards and decision-making with workers -- and positive labor relations 
encourage workers to act against shirking behavior and thus strengthen the potential for group 
incentive systems and team production to overcome the free rider problem and succeed.   
Group incentives and monitoring colleagues  
 
When will a worker act against a shirking fellow employee?   
  The natural economics answer is that a worker will so act when it pays off for that 
person, which almost invariably requires group incentive pay.  Building on Drago and Garvey 
(1998), it is easy to show that workers are more likely to intervene the higher the amount of the 
group incentive, the higher the probability that intervening increases the performance of the co-
worker, the lower the cost of intervening (which may depend on individual incentives), and the 
smaller the number of co-workers.  In addition, workers may gain respect from fellow workers 
and supervisors, which can translate into greater chances of promotion in the future. Workers  
4 
 
may discourage "shirkers" through peer pressure and non pecuniary sanctions such as social 
ostracism, personal guilt, or shame (Kandel and Lazear 1991).  Since the 1/N problem is smaller 
at small workplaces, cooperative agreements should be easier to establish and maintain in small 
companies than in large ones. 
Workers can also engage in punishing behavior to enforce group norms of high effort, 
and change the behavior of free riders.  Punishment may be effective in counteracting the free 
rider effect per the experimental results of Carpenter (2004).  He explains his results by noting 
that an increase in the size of a group has two opposing effects:  it “forces monitors to spread 
their resources thinner which might lead to more free riding,” but “there are also more people 
monitoring each free rider so it is not obvious whether the total amount of punishment each free 
rider receives will increase or decrease” (2004: 4).  Prendergast suggests that monitoring with a 
sufficiently low cost can negate the free rider problem but notes that “empirical evidence on peer 
pressure reveals behavioral responses different from those posited in the theory”.
1 
Finally in the workplace setting, management may seek to develop a corporate culture 
that emphasizes company spirit, promotes group cooperation, encourages social enforcement 
mechanisms, and so forth in order to encourage cooperative actions (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990; 
Blasi, Conte, and Kruse, 1996; Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein, 2003: 226-228).  Fudenberg and 
Maskin (1986) show how the free rider problem can be overcome in an ongoing relationship by a 
cooperative agreement among participants.  Using artificial agent modeling with small groups, 
Axelrod (1997) has shown how mutual cooperation can develop among agents through 
                                                 
1 Prendergast cites Weiss’ study of workers in a pharmaceutical company (1987) and Hansen’s examination (1997) 
of the incentives of telephone operators for a large financial corporation.  Both found that group incentives improved 
the performance of workers who were less productive under individual schemes but decreased the performance of  
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reciprocity.  Klos and Nooteboom (2001) explore the creation of interaction networks that have 
trust as a major component.  
Whatever model one uses to explain punishment of free riders, workers should be more 
likely to act against shirker when they:  a) have some financial interest in the performance of the 
firm; b) regularly participate in workplace decisions, which should reduce the cost of speaking 
out; and c) have trust in management and good labor-management relations, since in those 
situations, they can reasonably expect the firm to reward them for helping to reduce shirking.  If 
you don’t trust management, you can hardly be expected to report shirking to management.  If 
you regard labor-management relations as poor, you may view shirking as a justifiable response 
to management’s poor treatment of workers.  
Data  
Our study asked about worker responses to shirker behavior on two datasets.  The first 
dataset comes from the 2002 and 2006 General Social Surveys (GSS), on which we placed 
several questions on shared capitalism programs.  The GSS is a national area probability sample 
of non institutionalized adults conducted by NORC.  The 2002 GSS has a sample of 1,145 
employees, and the 2006 GSS has a sample of 1,081 employees, in for-profit companies.   The 
second dataset is based on surveys of employees in 14 companies with over 300 worksites that 
had one or more shared capitalist incentive program in 2001-2006 that we conducted as part of 
the NBER Shared Capitalism research program.
2 The response rates from employees averaged 
                                                                                                                                                             
more productive workers 
2  We drew up a sample of firms varying in size, industry, and type of program, and contacted them in various ways 
to participate.  As is usual in this sort of research, we were able to convince only some firms o participate.
  Once 
firms agreed to the survey, we surveyed either all employees or a random sample of employees.  The survey 
included core questions common across all companies, and some questions of special interest or relevance to that  
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53% across the 14 companies.  A total of 41,206 respondents provided usable surveys.  Question 
wordings and descriptive statistics for both surveys are in Appendix A. 
Neither survey is ideal.  The GSS is nationally representative, but has limited numbers of 
persons with different forms of compensation arrangements, which makes it hard to reach 
statistically valid conclusions in some areas.  Because it is a small national sample, workers are 
likely to all be employed by different firms so that we view comparisons among workers as 
comparisons across firms.  The NBER has a large number of respondents but they are taken from 
a sample of firms that is non random.  Because the NBER survey covers a small number of 
firms, much of the variation comes from variation among workers within firms, and we generally 
include firm fixed effects in analyses to focus on this variation.  By combining analyses of the 
small national sample that lives on cross-company variation and the larger non-random sample 
of workers from participating companies that lives on within- company variation, we hopefully 
surmount these weaknesses and can reach conclusions that have general validity.     
The innovation of our study is the new questions about workers’ ability to detect the 
performance of other workers at their workplace and their actions if they observed shirking.  We 
asked about the ability of workers to observe their peers’ effort because that is a necessary 
precondition for acting against shirking: 
In your job how easy is it for you to see whether your co-workers are working well or 
poorly? On a scale of 0 to 10 please describe with 0 meaning not at all easy to see and 10 
meaning very easy to see 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
company.  Six company surveys were conducted over the web, seven company surveys were done on paper, and one 
survey was done using both the web and paper surveys. Two firms that agreed to participate were bought out by 
other firms, who did not want to cooperate with the study.  
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Figure 1A displays the frequency distribution of answers from the GSS.  The distribution 
is concentrated at the upper end, with 49% of workers giving the highest possible answer about 
the ease of detecting how co-workers are doing, and another 28% giving answers in the 7-9 
categories.  Responses are also bunched at the 0 category as well, with 8% of workers giving this 
answer but otherwise there is a paucity of responses at the low end. Thus, the vast majority of 
workers think they have a good idea of how hard their fellow employees are working.  Looking 
at which employees report being able to observe co-workers shows a priori sensible variation 
among employees.  Workers who answered with a 7 or more to the question reported 
disproportionately that they work in a team as opposed to by themselves, and that they rely on 
coworkers and supervisors for help, compared to workers who answered 3 or less on seeing how 
coworkers perform (data not shown but available). In addition, 13% who answered 7 or higher 
reported that they are managers compared to 7% of those answered 3 or less.  
Figure 1B displays the frequency distribution of answers from the NBER survey.  The 
largest single group of respondents gave the maximum answer to their ability to observe their 
fellow employees, but the distribution is less concentrated than the distribution in the GSS, with 
proportionately half as many workers giving the 10 response.  Still, 62% of respondents gave a 
response of 7 or more to the observability question. 
  Given that most workers say that they can observe the effort of co-workers, what do they 
do if they catch someone shirking?  Our question was:  
If you were to see a fellow employee not working as hard or well as he or she should, 
how likely would you be to:  
 
A. Talk directly to the employee;  
B. Speak to your supervisor or manager;  
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C.  Do nothing  
D.  (contained on only some company surveys) Talk about it in a work group or team
3;  
 
The responses use a four-point scale: not at all likely, not very likely, somewhat likely, 
and very likely.  As a simple way to display the responses to these questions, we formed a 
summated rating anti-shirking index reflecting the likelihood of intervention against shirkers  
using a 1 to 4 scale, where 1 measures the lowest intervention and 4 the greatest intervention, by 
simply adding the values of responses across questions (Bartholemew et al, 2002).  The anti-
shirking index ranges from 3 to 12 for the observations based on the A to C responses and from 4 
to 16 for the smaller sample for which we asked part D as well.   In this ordering a 12 means that 
the worker reported that it was very likely they would talk to the shirking employee and very 
likely that they would talk to the supervisor and not at all likely that they would do nothing.  A 3 
means that they said it was very unlikely they would talk to the shirking employee, very unlikely 
they would talk to the supervisor, and very likely they would do nothing.   
Figure 2A summarizes the responses from the GSS.  It shows that the summary statistic 
differentiates people in a relatively continuous way.  If we organize the data into five bins, 
grouping the 3 and 4 responses, and the 5 and 6 responses, and so on, the distribution looks 
roughly uniform.  The anti-shirking index has a mean of 7.81 and a standard deviation of 2.94.  
Figure 2B gives the anti-shirking index for the NBER survey data. With the larger sample, the 
distribution has proportionately more persons in the middle of the distribution, which gives it a 
rough normal look.  But again, there is wide variation.  Some people are likely to take action 
against a shirker and some are likely to do little.  Our goal is to find out what differentiates 
workers in this form of behavior.    
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Table 1 shows for both data sets the proportion of workers who said it was likely or not 
likely that they would take one of the actions in response to shirking behavior by a fellow 
employee.  One finding is that more workers in the GSS sample than in the NBER companies 
say they would be “very likely” to take action against shirkers, which would seem to go against 
the idea that shared capitalism encourages anti-shirking activities; this difference, however, is 
primarily due to the larger establishment sizes in the NBER sample, and the difference is 
reversed when controlling for this and other factors distinguishing the samples.
4 In addition, the 
table shows that the greater concentration of responses at the upper end of the distribution in the 
GSS than in the NBER data set is due to the great proportion in the former who say they would 
talk to the shirking employee:  32.4% in the GSS versus 16.7% in the NBER dataset.  In the GSS 
proportionately more workers say that it is very likely that they would talk to an employee than 
would talk to a supervisor or manager, whereas in the NBER data set about the same proportion 
say it is very likely they would talk to the shirker as to a manager.
5 
  To move from hypothetical responses to actual behavior, in some company surveys we 
added a question, "Have you ever seen one of your fellow employees not working as hard or well 
as he or she should over an extended time period?"  Over half, 59%, of the respondents said yes.
6  
                                                                                                                                                             
3   This option was not included in the 2002 GSS and the early NBER surveys. 
4  GSS employees are also younger on average, and more likely to say they can see how well their co-workers are 
working.  When these two variables and establishment size are used in the GSS sample to predict anti-shirking, the 
predicted mean for the NBER sample is less than the actual mean, indicating that the NBER employees are generally 
more likely than would be expected to take action against shirkers.  
5  Since some respondents said that they did not have a supervisor or manager the sample size of answers to that 
question is smaller than the sample size for the other questions.  One possible objection to the anti-shirking index is 
that it combines disparate behaviors that may substitute for each other—for example, a worker may choose between 
talking to the shirker or supervisor but not want to do both.  We find, however, that the responses are highly 
correlated (the alpha for the index is .80 in the GSS data and .69 in the NBER data).  We also present results for 
each response separately in Table 4a and find results consistent with those using the anti-shirking index. 
6 The mean of the anti-shirking index for the 41% of workers who said they have not seen a co-worker shirking is 
not significantly different from the mean for the 59%, suggesting that there is no systematic difference in  
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We then asked what they did in response.  As seen in Table 2, 34% of the employees talked to 
the shirker, 46% talked to a supervisor or manager, 20% talked about it in a work group or team, 
5% did something else, and 29% did nothing (row 1).  Most important, these answers correlate 
highly with the respondents' reported likelihood of taking this action, as shown in rows 2 to 5:  
for example, 82% of those who said they were very likely to talk to the shirker actually did so, 
while only 6% of those who said it was not likely they would talk to the shirker actually did so. 
From the tabulations in Figures 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b, and Tables 1 and 2, we conclude that:  
most workers can tell when a fellow employee is shirking or not; there is wide variation in what 
they will do when faced with a situation in which someone shirks; and that this variation reflects 
variation in actual past behavior.   
 
Shared Capitalist Arrangements: Group Incentives and Labor Policies 
We have a wide set of measures of the group incentives and labor policies that we expect 
to affect worker responses to shirking behavior.  As far as we know, ours is the most 
comprehensive survey of group incentive policies in the United States. The overall prevalence of 
shared capitalist compensation is presented in Appendix Tables A-1 and A-2.  The most 
important result is that 45% of the for-profit private sector employees in the GSS sample report 
participating in some kind of shared capitalism program (36% in profit sharing, 25% in gain-
sharing, 19% in employee ownership, and 11% in stock options). This gives us good variation 
for examining the relation of these programs to worker outcomes. Regarding other work policies, 
the 2002 and 2006 GSS asked whether employees normally work as part of a team and how 
                                                                                                                                                             
willingness to take action against shirkers between these two groups.  
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often they participate with others in determining how things are done at their job. Over half 
(58%) of private sector workers report working in a team setting, and 44% report that they often 
participate with others in helping set the way things are done on a job.   
The prevalence of group incentives is necessarily higher in the NBER sample, since these 
firms were selected on the basis of having one or more shared capitalism programs.  About two-
thirds report profit sharing (71%) and owning company stock (64%), while about one-fifth report 
gainsharing (21%) and holding stock options (22%).  The figure for working as part of a team 
(59%) is similar to that for the GSS, and about one-third (35%) report being part of an employee 
involvement team. 
As a first step in assessing the relation of shared capitalism to employee outcomes, we 
constructed a thermometer-style index of shared capitalism, which assigns points based on 
coverage by shared capitalism programs and the size of the financial stakes.  This index is 
described in Appendix B.  We also present results breaking out the different forms of shared 
capitalism types and intensities.   
Shared Capitalist Incentives and Shirking 
To examine the determinants of anti-shirking behavior, we first regressed the anti-
shirking index on organizational/company policy variables and job and demographic factors.  As 
seen in Table 3, the shared capitalism index is linked to greater anti-shirking activity in both the 
GSS and NBER datasets.  Among the covariates, the ease of observing co-workers has a strong 
positive effect on the anti-shirking index, consistent with the idea that workers will be more 
likely to take action the greater the observability of shirking behavior.  The participation 
variables have a substantial positive impact on the anti-shirking index in both datasets, as does  
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job security in the NBER dataset.  Job task variety also has a strong positive effect (consistent 
with Drago and Garvey, 1998), indicating that knowledge of how to help is greater, and the costs 
of helping are lower, when the worker has a broader base of skills and overlap of tasks with the 
shirking co-worker. Those who are supervised more closely are less likely to engage in anti-
shirking behavior in the NBER dataset, perhaps reflecting a belief among closely-supervised 
workers that dealing with shirking is the supervisor's responsibility (to be addressed in Table 8).  
Finally, the data shows that the size of the workplace has a strong impact on anti-shirking 
behavior, with workers more likely to intervene more to stop shirking in a smaller workplace, 
where the shirking of one co-worker is more likely to affect them more than it would in a larger 
workplace.   
The specific behaviors making up the anti-shirking index are analyzed separately in 
Tables 4a and 4b.  The shared capitalism index is a positive predictor of each type of anti-
shirking behavior in both the GSS and NBER data, except for the likelihood of talking in a work 
group in the GSS data.  It seems that many workers with shared capitalism do not wish to talk 
about the shirker to the group in the shirker’s presence as they might find this embarrassing 
(consistent with concerns by workers that the shirker might resent them or other employees 
would react poorly, as presented in Table 8.) 
Types of shared capitalism 
  Which shared capitalism policies are responsible for the results given in our indices?  
Table 6 uses different types and intensities of shared capitalism to predict taking action against 
shirking.  In the GSS data, the most important factors behind anti-shirking activity is the 
presence of profit sharing and gain-sharing (col. 1).  In the NBER data, it is the intensity rather  
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than the presence of profit sharing and gain sharing that seems to matter.  The NBER results in 
column 2 show a very strong effect of the profit/gain sharing bonus size (not eligibility), along 
with strong positive effects of stock option holding and owning any company stock.   
  When the richer NBER data are used for a more detailed breakdown of shared capitalism 
in column 3 (along with more extensive controls, mirroring the specification in Table 3), anti-
shirking activity is strongly related to both profit sharing bonus size and gain sharing bonus size.  
There is one seemingly odd result, however.  The negative coefficient on eligibility combined 
with the positive coefficient on bonus size indicate that when the profit share is small, those 
eligible for profit sharing are less likely than non-eligible employees to take action.  As will be 
seen in Table 8, shared capitalism appears to increase the fear that co-workers will resent any 
anti-shirking action, so that low levels of profit sharing may have a negative effect on anti-
shirking activity but this reluctance is apparently overcome as the bonus grows larger.  For gain 
sharing, by contrast, simple eligibility increases anti-shirking behavior. 
  Consistent with the results of Drago and Garvey (1998), the effect of greater individual 
bonuses is negative and significant on anti-shirking behavior (column 3).  Apparently, individual 
bonuses focus workers on their own work and may lead them to see co-workers as competitors 
(or at least not cooperators).  By contrast, workers who received a stock option grant last year 
where more likely to take action against shirkers, although the size of the grant, and of one's 
holdings, do not seem to make a difference (col. 3).  Owning company stock is no longer a 
significant predictor in column 3, although in supplementary regressions (not reported here) we  
positive associations with some forms of ownership -- ESPP participation, holding stock after 
exercising options, holding stock purchased on the open market, and ESOP membership (this  
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latter result only when company fixed effects are not used
7).    That ownership appears to operate 
through simply owning stock and not the size of one's stake is consistent with findings from 
several other studies, which they attribute to higher organizational commitment (reviewed in 
Kruse and Blasi, 1997). Eight out of ten of the workers reporting employee ownership in the 
2002 GSS report they also have some form of profit/gain sharing or stock options, which 
indicates that some managers recognize the value of combining short-term rewards and long-
term equity (Blasi, Kruse, and Freeman 2006: 7) 
Before/After on Profit Sharing 
  The cross section data presented so far are consistent with the theory that shared 
capitalism affect the response of workers to shirking co-workers but cannot rule out the 
possibility that there are missing variables or other processes that affect results.  As we were 
conducting our survey, one firm told us that they intended to introduce a new profit-sharing plan 
that offered the chance to conduct a before/after analysis as well as a cross-section analysis of 
worker responses to group incentives. Accordingly, we administered our survey twice at this 
firm, six months apart, with the first survey coming before the firm introduced a new profit-
sharing plan, and the second survey coming after the firm had introduced the new plan.
8  
  As shown in Table 6, the introduction of the profit-sharing plan led to a jump in the 
percent of employees saying they are eligible for profit sharing from 59% at the first survey to 
                                                 
7   Company fixed effects are probably inappropriate to use in analyzing the effects of ESOP membership, since 
ERISA rules provide strict guidelines to ensure broad coverage.  The small number of non-ESOP members are 
likely to be very different from the ESOP members within a firm, and the effects of ESOP membership may be 
better judged by comparing ESOP members to otherwise-similar workers in other firms. 
8  The analyses presented so far use only the responses to the second survey at this company, to avoid having more 
than one survey from some employees.  The surveys did not have individual identifiers so respondents could not be 
tracked across the two surveys.  The higher response rate in the second survey is due in part to the provision of a $5 
bill accompanying this survey, but the surveys appear equally representative since the means on all variables (apart  
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88% at the second survey.  Apart from this, only two variables in the entire survey showed 
significant changes between the surveys:  the percent who say they were very likely to talk to a 
shirking co-worker (increase from 42% to 55%), and the percent who say that they would do 
something about a shirker because poor performance would hurt the bonus or stock value (from 
39% to 56%).  The fact that these are the only three variables that changed between the surveys 
indicates that there were not compositional changes or other policy changes that affected the 
results.  These results lend support to the prior findings, pointing toward a positive effect of 
profit sharing in attempts to combat co-worker shirking. 
Complementarities 
  Analysis of the decision equation for workers to intervene against shirking suggests that 
some of the factors that influence behavior should enter equations in an interactive rather than 
linear way..  The worker decides to intervene against a shirker when the expected benefits of 
intervening exceed the costs: p (G) – Cost, where p is the probability that the intervention will 
succeed, G is the gain to the worker and C is the cost.  The financial incentive would affect G; 
participation should affect p and the cost.  Labor-management relations L-M might affect both G 
and p.  More complicated analyses, in which the worker is assumed to take account of the 
possible behavior of other employees, lead to even more complexity, which we will ignore.  
Instead, we have looked for potential interactions among key variables in determining anti-
shirking behavior.   
  Using the nationally representative GSS data, Table 7a examines how shared capitalism 
interacts with company size, and Table 7b examines how it interacts with other company 
                                                                                                                                                             
from those highlighted in Table 8) were not significantly different between the two surveys.  
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policies.  Shared capitalism is most strongly associated with taking action against shirkers in the 
smallest workplaces, as shown in column 1 of Table 7a.  The supports the idea that the 1/N 
problem will be lower in smaller workplaces (note that the base estimates continue to show more 
anti-shirking activity among workers in small companies without profit/gain sharing, indicating 
that shirking may be perceived as more of an economic threat in small enterprises generally).  
The shared capitalist index effect is also significant in the next two larger size classes, and 
positive although not significant in the two largest classes.  An equally or even more important 
factor, however, appears to be the quality of the relationship with management.  As shown in 
column 2, shared capitalism is associated with anti-shirking activity most strongly when 
combined with a high level of trust in management.  While this could simply reflect column 1's 
finding of a more positive effect in small companies, the results in column 2 are maintained 
when the smallest companies are deleted (not shown here).  Similar results are obtained when 
shared capitalism is interacted with view of employee-management relations.
9  These results 
indicate that employees are likely to take action to increase productivity only when they are 
confident that any gains will in fact be shared with workers.  This suggests that large companies 
can use improved employee-management relations to counteract the 1/N problem.
10 
                                                 
9   The correlation between trust in management and view of employee management relations is .60, indicating they 
appear to represent a common attitude. 
10  We examined other ways in which shared capitalism arrangements may interact with workplace policies.  The 
positive shared capitalism effect on the likelihood of taking action against shirkers is lower among those who plan to 
look for a new job in the next year (presumably because they will not be around to receive the profit share), and in 
companies with high injury rates (which could worsen management employee relations and decrease expected 
tenure).  While some models predict that financial participation will have a positive interaction with participation in 
decision-making in affecting worker motivation and performance (e.g., Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995), we do not find 
significant interactions using the GSS participation measures (which are subjective and may mediate the effects of 
shared capitalism).  Further, we did not find that employee stock ownership or holding stock options alone were 
related to anti-shirking behavior.  This is consistent with the research literature and our findings in this and related 
papers in the NBER project that employee ownership and stock options generally interact with company culture in 
impacting performance, although there is evidence that employee ownership directly improves commitment.  Also,  
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  This result does not, however, carry over to within-company comparisons in the NBER 
data.  The most positive effect of shared capitalism on anti-shirking activity still occurs among 
employees with the most trust in management, but the shared capitalism index has a positive 
effect even when the NBER employees disagree that management is trustworthy.  We do not 
have a ready explanation for the difference between the two datasets.  Because almost all 
employees in the GSS sample work in different companies, we do not know if the positive 
interaction between shared capitalism and employee-management relations in that data set 
reflects the effect of companies with good employee-management relations in general, or of 
individuals who perceive good relations within a company (even if their co-workers do not).  We 
did some exploration of company and individual differences in the NBER data and found that 
anti-shirking behavior is generally strong in companies with higher average grades of employee-
management relations and trust in management, no matter the individual employee's grades of 
these items.  This suggests the importance of company culture in fostering an environment 
encouraging peer pressure. 
  The role of complementary company policies is explored with the NBER data in Table 
7b.  Column 1 essentially replicates the specification from Table 3, adding a control for the 
worker's perception that his or her fixed pay is at or above market level.  The strong positive 
effect of the wage variable is consistent with efficiency wage theories which posit that worker 
behavior can be improved when they are better paid. The shared capitalism index remains a 
positive predictor as this control is introduced.  The effect appears to be contingent, however, on 
                                                                                                                                                             
as noted, it is possible that some managers combine profit sharing and equity participation in order to get synergy 
between them. 
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other workplace policies.  The shared capitalist index has a strong positive interaction with a 
high performance policy index (col. 2), supporting the idea of complementarities among these 
policies in affecting worker behavior.
11  The shared capitalist index also has a strong negative 
interaction with closeness of supervision, and a positive interaction with having fixed pay at or 
above market level.  The negative supervision interaction may reflect a negative reaction to the 
mixed message received by workers:  we want you to work harder due to company-based pay, 
but we're nonetheless going to watch you very closely.  In this case the shared capitalism might 
be perceived by workers as primarily risk-sharing.  The positive interaction with having fixed 
pay at or above the market level may reflect a more positive response by workers when the 
company seems to be truly sharing, and not asking the worker to sacrifice pay levels in exchange 
for shared capitalist incentives.  Forms of employee ownership that are combined with below-
market pay might not be optimal for anti-shirking behavior because the incentive is diluted 
through what workers perceive as wage substitution. 
  These interaction results for supervision and high-performance policies are illustrated in 
Figure 3.  This figure shows how there is a positive relation between shared capitalism and the 
anti-shirking index only when there are high-performance policies and average or low levels of 
supervision.  Otherwise the relationship is negative. 
  Thus, incentive intensity is strongly related to anti-shirking activity, but appears to work 
best as part of a high-performance work system where workers are paid well and not supervised 
too closely. These results are consistent with the findings of Ichniowski et al. that workplace 
                                                 
11  These results showing the value of embedding such participation in a system of high performance work policies 
are consistent with the analysis of Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, and Kalleberg (2000) and Huselid (1995).  
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productivity is improved by combining several high-performance HR policies, and show that 
worker response to shirkers is likely an important mechanism in the higher productivity. 
Reasons For/Against Acting Against Shirkers 
  The dynamics underlying taking action against shirkers are explored more fully in Table 
8, which records employee responses to questions about why they might or might not do 
something about a shirking co-worker.  These questions were asked on only some of our 
company surveys.  Over half of workers said they would be likely to do something because the 
employee's performance could affect their own jobs (56%), reflecting interdependent work where 
cooperation can be especially productive.  Almost half of workers said they would do something 
because they would want to keep work standards high (47%), which can be seen as reflecting a 
cooperative solution to reinforce high work norms.  Almost as many workers expressed a 
financial incentive, saying the poor performance would lead to lower bonus or stock value 
(43%), while 45% said they simply like helping others and 31% said the employee might help 
them in the future.   
  The responses are related to level of participation in shared capitalism.  For example, the 
percent saying that poor performance would lead to lower bonus or stock value is almost twice as 
high among those with a high value on the shared capitalism index (58%, in col. 4) relative to 
those with a low value on the index (32% in col. 2).  Similarly, the former group is more likely to 
say they would do it to keep work standard high (59% compared to 42%).  Column 5 shows that 
the shared capitalism index is a strong predictor of five of the reasons for taking action. 
12  
                                                 
12  One possible objection to our focus on shared capitalism is that there are many reasons workers take action 
against shirkers, as shown in this table.  Of course, workers report and probably have a variety of reasons  -- which 
may also include simply noticing incompetence , as noted by Erik Maskin in discussing our paper -- and we do not  
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  The predominant reason for not taking action against shirkers is that it's seen as the 
supervisor's job (45%) followed closely by the fear that the shirking employee would resent it 
(41%).  About one-fourth (23%) feared that other employees would react poorly, while less than 
one-tenth (8%) directly expressed free ridership by saying that some other employee would 
probably take action.  The shared capitalism index is a strong predictor of the fear that the 
shirking employee would resent the action, perhaps because the intervener would be seen as 
acting out of a financial concern rather than out of concern for the worker.  As noted earlier, this 
may help explain why very low levels of profit sharing appear to be associated with reduced 
likelihood of taking action against shirkers—an effect that is more than counterbalanced by other 
reasons as the bonus size grows.  The shared capitalist index also, not surprisingly, predicts a 
lower likelihood that the employee will say there's no financial benefit or "nothing in it for me 
personally" (col. 5).  Therefore these data are consistent with the idea that shared capitalism can 
affect worker behavior. 
Outcomes of Anti-shirking Activity 
  What happened as a result of the action?  The data in Table 9 point up one of the dangers 
of taking action, as one-third (35%) of the workers said that the employee who was not working 
well resented it.  The most likely outcome, however, was that other employees appreciated the 
action (45%), while almost as many said the supervisor appreciated it (40%), and just over one-
third said that the employee's performance improved (36%). 
                                                                                                                                                             
pretend that workers have the simple motive of “anti-shirking” in their minds, or that shared capitalism is the only 
motivator.  These results show that shared capitalism is not related to two of the key reasons for taking action (“I 
like helping others” and “Employee may help me in the future”), but is clearly related to several reasons that reflect 
a concern with site performance efficiency.   
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  Does it help economic performance?  Only a minority of workers report that the 
employee's performance improved, but this may still be enough to make a difference in 
workplace performance.  Also, apart from actual anti-shirking actions, people may work harder 
simply knowing that their co-workers are likely to do something if they see signs of shirking.  
We do not have hard performance data, but we do have several survey measures of co-worker 
and facility performance that show a strong relationship with our anti-shirking measures.  Table 
10 shows that those who report a higher likelihood of talking to a shirker, and a lower likelihood 
of doing nothing, rate their co-workers' effort higher on a 0-10 scale.  The anti-shirking index is 
very strongly related not just to this measure, but also to a perception that workers tend to 
encourage each other, and to ratings of the facility on five specific measures of performance. 
Since several of these measures involve workers reporting on the behavior of others, it lessens 
the probability that that the interveners are putting a good spin on their behavior by reporting 
higher performance, as one reviewer has cautioned.  To check the possibility that this simply 
reflects individual characteristics (e.g., greater optimism about company performance among 
those who say they would take action against shirkers), we also calculated these relationships at 
the site level and found that worksites with higher average scores on the anti-shirking index also 
had significantly higher average evaluations of workplace performance.  This is illustrated in 
Figure 4 for one of our performance measures (evaluations of co-workers performance).
13 
Therefore this does not simply reflect an individual reporting phenomenon:  shared views of 
                                                 
13 We also find that site-level averages of the anti-shirking index are strongly related to site-level averages of a 
worker-reported performance index (containing the five items from the bottom of Table 10) and employee loyalty to 
the organization, although there is no strong relationship to site-level averages of willingness to work hard and 
turnover intention.  For one large multinational, the dataset has a number of hard operational measures of efficiency, 
but only at an aggregate division level, which makes analysis problematic.  
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higher performance in a workplace are related to shared commitments to take action against 
shirkers.  It appears that the propensity for anti-shirking activity does make a difference in 
performance.   
  One possible objection to these findings is that some production processes are difficult to 
supervise by managers so that work is arranged to rely on peer intervention.  Shared capitalism 
may be used not to encourage anti-shirking behavior, but directly to deter shirking, so that peer 
intervention and shared capitalism are both consequences of technologies rather than causally 
related to each other.  Our pre/post results in Table 6 go against this explanation.  We also tested 
this by examining the relationship in different industries, and by controlling for detailed 
manufacturing technologies (in our diversified multinational firm with diverse technologies such 
as plastics and aerospace).  The shared capitalism effect does not disappear, but in fact gets 
slightly stronger with more detailed controls for production technologies, making us more 




This study has examined employee responses to new questions on the 2002 and 2006 
General Social Surveys and a large database of NBER employee surveys on whether workers can 
                                                 
14   One limitation of our study is the lack of a measure of shirking per se.  However, we did ask each employee in 
two companies covering to respond on a 1-5 scale whether “There are days when I don’t put much effort into my 
job.”   Analysis of this variable indicates that workers reporting high effort are the ones who are more likely to 
intervene against shirkers.  Moreover, there is no direct relationship between the shared capitalism index and 
increased individual effort.  This reflects the finding that the principal impact of shared capitalism appears to work 
in combination with various aspects of company culture such as trust, high performance work systems, and fixed 
wages at or above market.  This suggests that  shared capitalism alone nor unique production  systems dependent on 
technologies are not creating anti-shirking work systems, but rather that   shared capitalism enhances anti-shirking 
together with company culture, and shared capitalism and positive company culture also impact the potential 
shirker’s level of effort.  These additional analyses are available from the authors.  
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easily observe whether co-workers are shirking and how workers respond to shirking.  The 
answers to the new questions provide valuable insight into the likely magnitude of mutual 
monitoring and peer pressure against shirking behavior.  They show that most workers believe 
that they are able to observe the effort/activity of fellow workers, which is the first prerequisite 
for mutual monitoring and peer pressure against shirking to work.  In addition, about half of the 
work force says that they would be very likely to respond to poor job performance by co-
workers, with more saying that they would talk to the shirker rather than reporting the behavior 
to management.  While there are some demographic correlates to responding against shirking, 
workplace factors are more strongly related to employee efforts to reduce shirking.  This 
conflicts with the claim that broad-based incentives will be weak for everyone because of free 
riding.
15   
Employees respond more against shirking in workplaces with shared capitalism 
institutions, and the findings suggest important complementarities between shared capitalism and 
high-performance policies, supervision intensity, and being paid at least the market wage.  
                                                 
15 The standard theory does not predict no anti-shirking intervention but only that it is likely to be suboptimal.  As 
our discussant Eric Maskin noted, there is “no way of telling what optimal intervention would be.” Our study does 
suggest, however, how the corporation can be structured to increase anti-shirking behavior and performance.  
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APPENDIX A:  Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
 
MONITORING AND RESPONDING TO SHIRKING 
 
Ease of seeing how well co-workers are working (GSS and NBER): "In your job how 
easy is it for you to see whether your co-workers are working well or poorly?" (0-10 
scale, 0=not at all easy to see and 10=very easy to see), GSS mean=7.74, s.d.=3.16, 
n=2192, NBER mean=6.81, s.d.=2.73, n=40971. 
 
Potential employee actions against shirkers (GSS and NBER):  "If you were to see a 
fellow employee not working as hard or well as he or she should, how likely would you 
be to:   
  a)  Talk directly to the employee 
  b) Speak to your supervisor or manager  
  c) Talk about it in a work group or team 
  d) Do nothing" 
  See distribution of answers in Table 1. 
 
Anti-shirking index:  Answers to above questions were coded on a 1-4 scale (1=not at 
all likely, 4=very likely), and scales were added for "talk directly to the employee," 
"speak to your supervisor or manager," and "do nothing"(reverse-scored)(3-12 scale).  
GSS alpha=.795, mean=7.81, s.d.=2.94, n=2115, NBER alpha=.69, mean=7.57, 
s.d.=2.49, n=35869. 
 
Past employee actions against shirkers (NBER):   
"Have you ever seen one of your fellow employees not working as hard or well as he or 
she should over an extended time period?" (0=no, 1=yes), Mean=.586, n=32010.   
If responded "yes", then "What action, if any, did you take?   
  a)  Talk directly to the employee,  
  b) Speak to your supervisor or manager,  
  c) Talk about it in a work group or team,  
  d) Do nothing" 
  See distribution of answers in Table 2. 
"What was the outcome of your actions?   
Employee not working well resented it 
Other employees appreciated it 
Supervisor appreciated it 
Employee not working well improved 
Other"   
  See distribution of answers in Table 9. 
 
Why people do or do not act against shirkers (NBER):    
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"Why might you be likely to do something when a fellow employee is not working as 
hard or well as he or she should?  (Mark all that apply) 
I like helping others 
Employee might help me in the future 
Poor performance will cost me and other employees in bonus or stock value 
Other employees appreciate it when someone steps forward 
Want to keep work standards high 
Employees poor performance could affect my own job 
Other (What?) 
Why might you be likely to do nothing when a fellow employee is not working as hard or 
well as he or she should?  (Mark all that apply) 
Employee not working well would resent it 
Other employees would react poorly 
It's the supervisor's job, not mine 
Some other employee will probably take action 
Some other employee could take care of it 
There's no financial benefit for me 
Nothing in it for me personally 
Other (What?)" 





Shared capitalism index (GSS):  8-point index with one point each for profit sharing 
eligibility, gain sharing eligibility, owning any company stock, holding any stock options, 
receiving a profit sharing bonus in the past year, receiving a gain sharing bonus in the 
past year, having an above-median profit- and gain sharing bonus as a percent of pay, and 
having an above-median company stock holding as a percent of pay.  Mean=1.48, 
s.d.=2.14, n=1919 
 
Shared capitalism index (NBER):  10-point index with all items in GS index, plus one 
point each for receiving a stock option grant in the past year, and having above-median 
stock option holdings as a percent of pay.  Mean=3.60, s.d.=2.65, n=40522 
 
Profit sharing (GSS and NBER):  "In your job are you eligible for any type of 
performance-based pay, such as individual or group bonuses, or any type of profit-
sharing?  What does the size of these performance-based payments depend on?  
Company profits or performance" (0=no, 1=yes), GSS mean=.372, n=2184, NBER 
mean=.713, n=41018 
 
Profit sharing as % of pay (GSS and NBER):  If "yes" to profit sharing, answer to 
"What was the approximate total dollar value of the payment(s) you received [in the most  
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recent year of bonuses]?" divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0.  GSS mean=.024, 
s.d.=.066, n=1944, NBER mean=.068, s.d.=.124, n=40485 
 
Gainsharing (GSS and NBER):  "In your job are you eligible for any type of 
performance-based pay, such as individual or group bonuses, or any type of profit-
sharing?  What does the size of these performance-based payments depend on?  
Workgroup or department performance" (0=no, 1=yes), GSS mean=.257, n=2184, NBER 
mean=.207, n=41023 
 
Gainsharing as % of pay (GSS and NBER):  If "yes" to gainsharing, answer to "What 
was the approximate total dollar value of the payment(s) you received [in the most recent 
year of bonuses]?" divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0. GSS mean=.017, 
s.d.=.061, n=2013, NBER mean=.033, s.d.=.106, n=40767 
 
Individual bonus (GSS and NBER):  "In your job are you eligible for any type of 
performance-based pay, such as individual or group bonuses, or any type of profit-
sharing?  What does the size of these performance-based payments depend on?  
Individual performance" (0=no, 1=yes).  GSS mean=.290, n=2184, NBER mean=.290, 
n=41019 
 
Individual bonus as % of pay (NBER):  If "yes" to individual bonus, answer to "What 
was the approximate total dollar value of the payment(s) you received [in the most recent 
year of bonuses]?" divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0.  Mean=.050, s.d.=.125, 
n=40547 
 
Hold employer stock (GSS):  "Do you own any shares of stock in the company where 
you now work, either directly or through some type of retirement or stock plan?" (0=no, 
1=yes), mean=.212, n=2202 
 
Employer stock as % of pay (GSS):  If "yes" to "hold employer stock," answer to 
"Please give a general estimate of how much cash you would get if all this stock were 
sold today?" divided by annual earnings, otherwise 0, mean=.111, s.d.=.977, n=2186 
   
Hold employer stock (NBER):  Any employer stock held through ESOP, Employee 
Stock Purchase Plan, 401(k), exercised stock options, or open market purchases (0=no, 
1=yes), mean=.640, n=41206 
 
Employer stock as % of pay (NBER):  If "yes" to "Hold employer stock," the sum of 
answers to questions about value of stock held in different plans, divided by 




Hold stock options (GSS and NBER):  "Do you currently hold any stock options in your 
company (vested or unvested)?" (0=no, 1=yes), GSS mean=.123, n=2188, NBER 
mean=.219, n=41166. 
 
Stock options as % of pay (NBER):  If "yes" to "Hold stock options," the sum of 
answers to questions about value of vested and unvested stock, divided by 
basepay+overtime, otherwise 0. NBER mean=.395, s.d.=1.490, n=40922 
 
EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS       
 
Make decisions with others (GSS): "In your job, how often do you take part with others 
in making decisions that affect you?" (1-4 scale, 1=never, 4=often), mean=3.08, s.d.=.93, 
n=2211  
     
Help set way things done on job (GSS): "How often do you participate with others in 
helping set the way things are done on your job?" (1-4 scale, 1=never, 4=often), 
mean=3.14, s.d.=.92, n=2210 
     
High participation in decisions (GSS):  This measure has a score of 1 if the sum of 
scales of the above two items is 7 or 8, and 0 otherwise.  Mean=.466, n=2226. 
 
Lot of participation in job decisions (NBER):  "How much involvement and direct 
influence do YOU have in: Deciding HOW to do your job and organize the work" (coded 
1 if "a lot", 0 otherwise) mean=0.51, n=40750 
 
Lot of participation in department goals (NBER):  "How much involvement and direct 
influence do YOU have in:  Setting GOALS for your work group or department" (coded 
1 if "a lot", 0 otherwise) mean=0.21, n=40594 
 
Lot of participation in company decisions (NBER):  "How much involvement and 
direct influence do YOU have in: Overall company decisions" (coded 1 if "a lot", 0 
otherwise) mean=0.04, n=40520 
  
EI team (NBER):  " Some companies have organized workplace decision-making in 
ways to get more employee input and involvement.  Are you personally involved in any 
team, committee or task force that addresses issues such as product quality, cost cutting, 
productivity, health and safety, or other workplace issues?" (0=no, 1=yes), mean=.35, 
n=40122 
 








Co-worker effort (NBER):  "At your workplace, how hard would you say that people 
work?" (0-10 scale, 0=not at all hard, 10-very hard), mean=7.07, s.d.=2.10, n=40738. 
 
Fixed pay at or above mkt. (NBER): "Do you believe your fixed annual wages are 
higher or lower than those of employees with similar experience and job descriptions in 
other companies in your region?" (coded 0 if <3 on 1-5 scale, and 1 if 3 or greater) 
mean=.59, n=35860 
     
High performance policies (NBER):  Additive index of EI team, training, and job 
security measures.  Mean=1.77, s.d.=.86, n=37125 
 
  How closely supervised (NBER): "Are you closely supervised, or do you work fairly 
independently of close supervision?" (0-10 scale, 0=independent of close supervision, 
10= closely supervised), mean=3.35, s.d.=2.63, n=40845     
 
Job security (NBER): "Thinking about the next twelve months, how likely do you think 
it is that you will lose your job or be laid off?" (coded 0 if somewhat or very likely, and 1 
if not at all likely or not very likely), mean=.843, n=38510   
      
Task variety (GSS): "I get to do a number of different things on my job." (1-4 scale, 
1=strongly disagree, 4=strongly agree), mean=3.24, s.d.=.71, n=2210. 
 
Training (NBER): "In the last 12 months have you received any formal training from 
your current employer, such as in classes or seminars sponsored by the employer?" 
(0=no, 1=yes), mean=.564, n=40460 
     
Mgt. is trustworthy (GSS): "I trust the management at the place where I work." (1-4 
scale, 1=strongly disagree, 4=strongly agree), mean=2.97, s.d.=0.85, n=2201 
       
Work as part of team (GSS and NBER):  "In your job, do you normally work as part of 
a team or group, or do you work mostly on your own?" (coded 1 if part of team, 0 
otherwise), GSS mean=.58, n=2206, n=, NBER mean=.59, n=32301. 
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APPENDIX B:  The shared capitalist thermometer index 
  As a first step in assessing the relation of shared capitalism to employee outcomes, we 
constructed a thermometer-style index of shared capitalism.  This index assigns one point each 
when the worker was covered by any of the shared capitalist forms of compensation about which 
the survey asked, with additional points for recent bonuses or grants, and for large bonuses or 
stock holdings.  For questions with a continuous numeric answer, we gave the item a value of 1 
if the respondent had a value greater than the median value.  Because there is no natural ordering 
of shared capitalist systems in the sense that a firm first introduces profit-sharing, then adds 
employee ownership, and then gain-sharing, the index is not a Guttman scale.  It is a simple 
summated rating (Bartholomew et al, 2002; Bartholomew, 1996), using dichotomous scoring. 
  In the GSS, there are eight variables in the index: profit sharing eligibility, gain sharing 
eligibility, owning any company stock, holding stock options, receiving a profit sharing bonus in 
the past year, receiving a gain sharing bonus in the past year, having an above-median profit- and 
gain sharing bonus as a percent of pay, and having an above-median company stock holding as a 
percent of pay.  In the NBER data there are ten variables in the index: all of the above items plus 
one point each for receiving a stock option grant in the past year, and having above-median stock 
option holdings (including unvested options if they could be exercised today) as a percent of pay.   
  Indices of this style have both advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, they 
provide a quick and ready measure of the extent of shared capitalist arrangements that makes it 
easy to compare results across surveys and to summarize the broad thrust of findings.  Since our 
firm surveys covered only firms with some shared capitalist arrangements, the index allows us to 
differentiate workers with differing degrees of incentive to their firm’s programs.  On the  
30 
 
negative side, the index treats different programs the same even though they potentially have 
different effects on particular outcomes.  It postulates a single scale with equal weights rather 
than using factor analysis or other statistical modelling to obtain weights for given factors.   To 
deal with these problems, we estimated the relationship of the outcomes to the different types of 
shared capitalism, introduced as dummy or continuous variables in regressions.16  Appendix B 
gives the results of those calculations.  By comparing the results in the appendix tables with 
those in the text, we can assess the loss of information due to the amalgamation of the measures 
into a single index.  
  Figure B1 shows the distribution of our shared capitalism index in the GSS.  This survey 
estimates that 40% of US workers have some form of shared capitalist program.  This estimate is 
close to that obtained by Dube and Freeman in the WRPS.  The mean score of the index is 1.48 – 
a figure greatly affected by the substantial number of workers without shared capitalism systems.  
Conditional on having a program, most workers report scores in the range of 2 to 5, with 6% 
reporting scores of 6 or greater.  Figure B2 gives the distribution of the index in the NBER 
survey data.  It also shows a non-normal distribution, with the most common scores as 2 to 4 but 
a sizeable number of workers scoring 7 or above.  There is sufficient variation in the index to 
differentiate the extent of the shared capitalist “treatment” on workers. 
                                                 
16 There are statistical techniques to deal with the formation of latent variable indices from questions of the sort that 
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Figure 1a:  GSS Distribution of Workers by How Well They Can See Whether Co-
workers are Working Well or Poorly
8.4%


















Figure 1b:  NBER Distribution of Workers by How Well They Can See Whether Co-
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Figure 4: Anti-shirking and Worker Effort at Site Level 
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Table 1:  Potential Employee Actions Against Shirkers 
 
     Talk to  Talk to  Talk about  Do  
     employee  supervisor  it in work  Nothing 
       or manager  group or team   
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Response to fellow worker not working 
as hard or well as he or she should:         
 GSS         
  Not at all likely 26.0% 28.0% 36.1% 38.8%
  Not very likely 17.2% 22.4% 20.3% 20.5%
 Somewhat  likely 24.4% 25.1% 24.0% 17.6%
 Very  likely 32.4% 24.4% 19.7% 23.0%
 n 2183 2137 1058 2173
 NBER         
  Not at all likely 28.1% 21.5% 28.6% 36.7%
  Not very likely 25.4% 26.8% 26.5% 24.1%
 Somewhat  likely 29.9% 34.8% 31.3% 22.4%
 Very  likely 16.7% 17.0% 13.5% 16.8%




Table 2:  Past Employee Actions Against Shirkers 
 
      NBER Survey             
       Talk to  Talk to  Talk about  Do  
       employee  supervisor  it in work  Nothing 
         or manager  group or team   
         (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Actions actually taken when saw fellow         
  worker not working as hard or well as         
  he or she should^         
    33.5% 46.0% 20.3% 29.3%
  
  
If said likelihood of this action 
was:        
    Not at all likely 6.1% 12.4% 3.9% 14.8%
    Not very likely 13.9% 26.6% 9.1% 17.0%
   Somewhat  likely 54.6% 65.3% 34.0% 41.9%
      Very likely 81.7% 84.9% 52.8% 72.4%
  
   n 18744 18744 18744 18744
Workers were asked "Have you ever seen one of your fellow employees not working as hard or well 
as he or she should over an extended time period?"  The above answers are based on the 58.6% who 
responded "yes".  They were then asked "What action, if any, did you take?"  In addition to the actions 
listed above, 5.2% said they would do "something else".  
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Table 3: Effects of Shared Capitalism on Anti-shirking Index  
 
  GSS data      GSS data    NBER data 
 Shared capitalism index  0.115
 
(.035) *** 0.072 (0.034) ** 0.027  (0.009) ***
   
Ease of seeing how well       
  co-worker is working  0.086 (.024) *** 0.061 (0.024) ** 0.130  (0.005) ***
Work as part of team  1.060 (.059) *** 0.766 (0.157) ***  
High participation in 
decisions  1.207 (0.153) ***  
Task variety  0.308 (0.103) ***  
 
Any individual bonuses     0.199  (0.036) ***
Employee involvement 
team   0.571  (0.028) ***
Formal training    0.235  (0.028) ***
Job security    0.445  (0.037) ***
How closely supervised    -0.013  (0.006) **
     
Size 1-9 ees.  1.255 (.278) *** 1.015 (0.271) ***  
       10-49 ees.  1.211 (.259) *** 1.073 (0.250) ***  
       59-99 ees.  0.933 (.280) *** 0.858 (0.269) **  
       100-999 ees.  0.427 (.244) * 0.412 (0.235)     
       1000+ ees. (excl.)     
     
n   1634 1633  32099 
R-sq.  0.131 0.176    0.192     
         
The GSS regressions include controls for occupation (7 dummies), age, years of tenure, female, black, 
Hispanic, education (4 dummies), full-time status, ln(yearly earnings), and dummy for survey year 2006. 
The NBER regressions include controls for occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), hourly pay 
status, supervisory status, years of tenure, hours worked per week, union status, country (27 dummies), 
age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number of kids, 




Table 4a: Specific Responses to Shirking, GSS 
 
Based on ordered probits 
    Likelihood    Likelihood   Likelihood   
   of talking      of talking to    of talking in   
   to shirker      sup./manager    work group   
   (1)       (2)       (3)       
Shared capitalism index  0.038 (0.015) *** 0.038 (0.014) *** -0.011  (0.022)  
                   
Ease of seeing how well  0.033 (0.010) *** 0.022 (0.010) **  0.029  (0.016) * 
  co-worker is working                   
Work as part of team  0.426 (0.063) *** 0.298 (0.062) *** 0.138  (0.099)  
                   
Size 1-9 ees.  0.469 (0.112) *** 0.448 (0.111) *** -0.393  (0.165) ** 
 10-49 ees.  0.432 (0.104) *** 0.417 (0.104) *** -0.166  (0.150)  
 59-99 ees.  0.293 (0.111) *** 0.390 (0.110) *** -0.304  (0.163)  
 100-999 ees.  0.086 (0.101)   0.208 (0.100) **  0.007  (0.143)  
 1000+ ees. (excl.)               
 
n   1676     1641     800     
(Pseudo) R-sq.  0.058     0.034     0.019     
Cut point 1  0.886 (0.379)   -0.020 0.370   -1.365  0.562  
Cut point 2  1.407 (0.380)   0.598 0.371   -0.818  0.561  
Cut point 3  2.077 (0.382)   1.325 0.371   -0.094  0.560   
The regressions include controls for occupation (7 dummies), age, years of tenure, female, black, 




Table 4b: Specific Responses to Shirking, NBER 
 
Based on ordered probits 
    Likelihood    Likelihood   Likelihood   
   of talking      of talking to    of talking in   
   to shirker      sup./manager    work group   
   (1)       (2)       (3)       
Shared capitalism index  0.010 (0.004) **  0.007 (0.004) *  0.009  (0.005) * 
                   
Any individual bonuses  0.061 (0.017) *** 0.084 (0.017) *** 0.050 (0.020) ** 
Ease of seeing how well  0.045 (0.002) *** 0.057 (0.002) *** 0.037  (0.003) ***
  co-worker is working                   
Employee involvement 
team 0.224 (0.013) *** 0.192 (0.013) *** 0.195  (0.015) ***
Formal training  0.146 (0.013) *** 0.055 (0.013) *** 0.065  (0.014) ***
Job security  0.132 (0.018) *** 0.206 (0.018) *** 0.084  (0.019) ***
How closely supervised  0.002 (0.003)    -0.002 (0.003)    0.007  (0.003) ** 
                   
n    33807    33544    25570    
(Pseudo)  R-sq.  0.071    0.049    0.022    
Cut point 1  0.152 (0.254)   0.198 (0.252)  
-
0.020 (0.664)  
Cut point 2  0.907 (0.254)   1.012 (0.252)   0.700  (0.664)  
Cut point 3  1.920 (0.255)    2.104 (0.252)    1.715  (0.664)   
The regressions include controls for occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), hourly pay status, 
supervisory status, years of tenure, hours worked per week, union status, country (27 dummies), age, 
gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number of kids, race 




Table 5: Effects of Particular Forms of Shared Capitalist  
Compensation on Anti-shirking Index 
 
Based on OLS regressions 
The GSS regression includes controls for occupation (7 dummies), age, years of tenure, female, black, 
Hispanic, education (4 dummies), full-time status, ln(yearly earnings), co. size (4 dummies), ease of 
observing co-workers, and dummy for survey year 2006. 
The NBER regression in column 2 contains the GSS controls from column 1 except co. size, plus 
company and country fixed effects. 
The NBER regression in column 3 includes the controls from column 2 plus hourly pay status, supervisory 
status, hours worked per week, union status, marital status (2 dummies), family size, number of kids, race 
(4 dummies), disability status, ln(fixed pay), closeness of supervision, employee involvement team, 
training in past year, high job security, and company fixed effects. 
 
  GSS    NBER    NBER    
   (1)       (2)       (3)      
PROFIT & GAIN SHARING             
Profit sharing or gain sharing 
eligibility  0.344 (0.183) * 0.010 (0.040)        
Profit sharing-gain sharing bonus as 
% of base pay  0.742 (0.887)    1.424 (0.143)  ***       
Profit sharing eligibility               -0.181 (0.045) ***
Profit sharing bonus as % of base pay               0.596 (0.202) ***
Gain sharing eligibility               0.099 (0.056) * 
Gain sharing bonus as % of base pay               0.675 (0.223) ***
Individual bonus eligibility         0.250 (0.053) ***
Individual bonus as % of base pay               -0.480 (0.230) ** 
                     
STOCK OPTIONS                    
Stock option holding  0.237 (0.293)   0.440 (0.075)  ***  -0.043 (0.110)  
Stock option value as % of base pay               0.001 (0.011)   
Stock option grant last year               0.212 (0.108) ** 
Stock option grant as % of avg. grant               0.014 (0.023)   
                     
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP                   
Co. stock ownership  0.020 (0.298)    0.182 (0.038)  ***  0.051 (0.042)   
Co. stock as % of base pay  0.141 (0.101)    0.027 (0.018)    -0.023 (0.019)   
            
R-squared .132     .113     .195    





Table 6: Longitudinal Evidence: Two waves of same company  
 





sharing  Change  
   announced)  in place)     
   (1)  (2)       
Profit sharing    58.6% 87.9%  29.2% *** 
    
VERY/SOMEWHAT LIKELY TO TAKE ACTION 
AGAINST SHIRKER 
       Talk to shirking employee  42.1% 54.5%  12.4% *** 
       Talk to supervisor or manager  64.3% 68.1%  3.9%  
       Talk about it in workgroup  47.3% 48.8%  1.5%  
       Do nothing  34.1% 33.7%  -0.4%  
WHY YOU ARE LIKELY TO TAKE ACTION 
I like helping others  47.4% 49.6%  2.3%  
Employee might help me in the future  30.6% 33.5%  2.9%  
Poor performance will cost me and other employees 
in bonus or stock value  38.8% 56.1% 17.3% *** 
Other employees appreciate it when someone steps 
forward 34.3% 34.4%  0.1%  
Want to keep work standards high  59.3% 59.6%  0.3%  
Employee's poor performance could affect my own 
job  57.1% 56.3% -0.8%  
Other (What?)  14.2% 10.0%  -4.2%  




Table 7a: Company Size and Employee-Management Relations as  
Moderators of Shared Capitalism 
 
Dep. variable=anti-shirking index                         
   GSS data         NBER data   
                     
   (1)       (2)       (3)       
Shared cap. index * co. size of:                
       1-9 ees.  0.281 (0.085) ***             
       10-49 ees.  0.117 (0.068) *              
       59-99 ees.  0.195 (0.085) **              
       100-999 ees.  0.029 (0.057)                
       2000+ ees.   0.045 (0.076)                
Shared cap. index * mgt. is                    
trustworthy                    
   Strongly disagree (D or F in col. 3)        0.043 (0.165)    0.048  (0.014) *** 
   Disagree (C in col. 3)        0.117 (0.072)    -0.001  (0.013)  
   Agree (B in col. 3)        0.083 (0.048) *   0.014  (0.010)  
   Strongly agree (A in col. 3)        0.179 (0.064) *** 0.054  (0.013) *** 
                     
Mgt. is trustworthy:                    
    Strongly disagree (excl.)                    
    Disagree  0.057 (0.181)    -0.053 (0.414)    0.499  (0.064) *** 
    Agree  -0.249 (0.210)    0.122 (0.374)    0.710  (0.065) *** 
    Strongly agree  -0.199 (0.313)    0.208 (0.398)    0.838  (0.081) *** 
Size 1-9 ees.  0.855 (0.345) **  1.179 (0.283) ***      
       10-49 ees.  1.005 (0.336) *** 1.143 (0.259) ***      
       59-99 ees.  0.585 (0.366)   0.885 (0.281) ***      
       100-999 ees.  0.403 (0.317)    0.407 (0.244) *        
       1000+ ees. (excl.)                    
n   1631     1627      31770     
(Pseudo) R-sq.  0.137       0.132       0.205       
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses) 
The GSS regression includes controls for occupation (7 dummies), age, years of tenure, female, black, 
Hispanic, education (4 dummies), full-time status, ln(yearly earnings), ease of observing co-workers, work 
as part of team, and dummy for survey year 2006. 
The NBER regressions include controls for occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), hourly pay 
status, supervisory status, years of tenure, hours worked per week, union status, country (27 dummies), 
age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number of kids, 
race (4 dummies), disability status, ln(fixed pay), employee involvement team, training in past year, job 





Table 7b:  Company Policies as Moderators of Shared Capitalism 
 
Dep. variable=anti-shirking index                   
          
            
   (1)        (2)       
Shared capitalism index  0.028 (0.010) ***  -0.018  (0.018)   
            
Employee involvement team  0.544 (0.030) ***       
Formal  training  0.232 (0.029) ***     
Job  security  0.431 (0.040) ***     
High perf. policy index        0.259  (0.030)  ***
* shared capitalism index        0.035  (0.006)  ***
            
How closely supervised   -0.014 (0.006) **  0.030  (0.010)  ***
* shared capitalism index        -0.013  (0.002)  ***
            
Fixed pay at or above market  0.181 (0.028) *** 0.043  (0.050)     
* shared capitalism index        0.034  (0.010)  ***
            
n    28424    28424    
(Pseudo) R-sq.  0.193       0.194       
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses) 
Based on NBER data.  The regressions include controls for occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 
dummies), hourly pay status, supervisory status, years of tenure, hours worked per week, union 
status, country (27 dummies), age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college 
graduate, graduate degree, number of kids, race (4 dummies), disability status, ln(fixed pay), 
ease of observing co-workers, individual bonuses, and company fixed effects. 
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Table 8: Why People Do/Do not Act against Shirkers 
 
Based on NBER data 
^  Shared capitalism index of 5 or greater="upper", 3 to 4="middle", and 0 to 2="lower" 
^^ Based on linear probability models predicting whether employee checked this reason, controlling for 
ease of observing co-worker, closeness of supervision, occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), 
hourly pay status, supervisory status, tenure in years, hours worked per week, union status, age, gender, 
marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number of kids, race (4 




Position in shared 
capitalism^ Coeff.  on 
    All  Lower  Middle  Upper  SC index^^ 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
WHY YOU MIGHT DO SOMETHING              
I like helping others  44.9% 47.2% 43.2%  42.8%  0.001 
Employee might help me in the future  31.0% 32.0% 30.5%  29.7%  0.003 
Poor performance will cost me and other 
employees in bonus or stock value  42.9% 32.0% 48.5%  58.2%  0.038*** 
Other employees appreciate it when someone 
steps forward  23.9% 19.9% 24.9% 32.0%  0.008*** 
Want to keep work standards high  46.6% 41.6% 46.6%  58.9%  0.015*** 
Employee's poor performance could affect 
my own job  55.9% 53.2% 56.9% 61.3%  0.010*** 
Other (What?)  6.8% 5.7% 7.0%  8.9%  0.003*** 
n   32386 13991 12514  5463   
        
WHY YOU MIGHT DO NOTHING              
Employee not working well would resent it  41.3% 37.9% 43.2%  44.7%  0.015*** 
Other employees would react poorly 23.4% 24.3% 23.3%  21.8%  0.000 
It's the supervisor's job, not mine  44.7% 45.0% 46.8%  39.7%  0.001 
Some other employee will probably take 
action 8.4% 10.5% 7.2%  6.1%  0.000 
There's no financial benefit for me  7.7% 10.2% 6.6%  4.9%  -0.003*** 
Nothing in it for me personally  11.0% 13.3% 10.1%  8.0%  -0.003** 
Other (What?)  12.4% 8.8% 13.3%  19.0%  0.007*** 
N 30363 12236 12284  5444 
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Table 9: Responses to Anti-Shirking Actions 
 
 
Based on NBER data. 
Workers were asked "Have you ever seen one of your fellow employees not working as hard or well 
as he or she should over an extended time period?"   If yes, they were then asked "What action, if any, 
did you take?"  Those who reported taking some action (see Table 2) were then asked the above 




 Yes No 
Don't 
know n  
 
What was the outcome of your 
actions?           
  
Employee not working well 
resented it  34.7% 19.1% 46.2%  14125
  Other  employees  appreciated it  45.0% 11.4% 43.6%  13676
  Supervisor  appreciated  it  40.1% 15.5% 44.4%  13845
  
Employee not working well 
improved 35.7% 38.9% 25.4%  14254
      Other    28.3% 9.9% 61.8%  2923
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Table 10:  Relation of Anti-shirking Behavior to Co-worker Performance 
                              
A. Average ratings of co-worker effort (0-10 scale) 
   Anti-shirking  action   
        
    Talk to  Talk to  Do 
   shirker  sup./man.  nothing 
      
  Not at all likely 6.7  6.8  7.2 
  Not very likely 7.0  7.1  7.1 
  Somewhat likely 7.3  7.2  7.0 
   Very likely 7.5  7.1  6.6 
 
B.  Anti-shirking index as predictor of workplace performance       
   Summated     
    rating    
 Dep.  var.  coeff. (s.e.)  T or Z  n 
  Rating of co-worker effort (0-10 scale, OLS)  0.109  (0.004)  25.24  35637
  Workers encourage each other (-1, 0, 1, ordered probit)  0.135  (0.005)  27.14  12659
  Grade of facility performance (0-4 scale, OLS):         
  A. Getting the job done that has to get done efficiently  0.050  (0.002)  21.12  22810
 B.  Practicing  accountability  0.066  (0.003)  23.32  22705
  C. Delivering customers' products on time.  0.021  (0.003)  7.68  22700
  D. Delivering highest quality customer products.  0.044  (0.003)  17.69  22704
  E. Being the market leader in its products.  0.032  (0.003)  13.18  22569
Based on NBER data  
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Table A-1  – Current Prevalence of Shared Capitalism Plans
Source: GSS GSS NOS
Year: 2002 2006 2002




Percent of employees covered
Eligible for bonuses based on company performance 34% 38% 46%
Received bonus last year based on company performance 24% 30%
Percent of firms with plans
Any employees eligible for bonuses based on 62%
    company performance
GAINSHARING
Percent of employees covered
Eligible for bonuses based on department or team performance 23% 27% 23%
Received bonus last year based on department or team performance 17% 21%
Percent of firms with plans
Any employees eligible for bonuses based on department or team performance 35%
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
Percent of employees covered
Own company stock                                    21% 18% 16%
Percent of firms
Any employees own company stock                                    33%
STOCK OPTIONS 13%
Percent of employees covered
Hold stock options                                         9%
Granted stock options last year                        5%
Percent of firms
Any employees granted stock options last year     14%
COMBINATIONS
Any of above 43% 47%
Just one form:
Rec'd profit- or gainsharing bonus last year 14.6% 21.2%
Hold company stock 5.0% 3.8%
Hold stock options 0.7% 0.7%
Two forms:
Hold co. stock and rec'd profit- or gainsharing bonus last year 3.7% 5.3%
Hold co. stock and stock options 6.1% 3.2%
Hold stock options and rec'd profit- or gainsharing bonus last year 0.4% 0.6%
All three forms 6.1% 4.6%




TABLE A-2:  Shared capitalism types and intensities in GSS and NBER datasets
General NBER      Sample sizes
Social company
Survey dataset GSS NBER
2002-2006
Bonus eligibility
Profit sharing  35.9% 71.3% 2386 41018
Gainsharing 24.9% 20.7% 2386 41023
Size of most recent bonus, if eligible for any
Mean dollar value $6,265 $11,329 693 26113
Median dollar value $1,500 $2,000 693 26113
Mean % of pay 8.9% 12.1% 645 22019
Median % of pay 4.6% 5.7% 645 22019
Employee ownership
Own employer stock in any form 19.4% 64.0% 2406 41206
Own employer stock through:
Employee Stock Ownership Plan 8.1% 41109
Employee Stock Purchase Plan 17.6% 40990
401(k) plan 33.5% 40885
Exercising options and keeping stock 5.0% 41032
Open market purchase 7.3% 41145
Value of employer stock, if own stock
Dollar value:  Mean $63,130 $60,078 318 25447
                   Median $10,000 $14,375 318 25447
% of pay:     Mean 81.7% 65.0% 302 22715
                   Median 23.0% 30.6% 302 22715
% of wealth:  Mean 19.6% 23141
                   Median 10.0% 23141
Stock options
Currently hold stock options 11.3% 21.9% 2392 41166
Ever granted stock options 22.3% 41166
Granted stock options last year 20.4% 41158
Value of stock options, if hold options:
Mean dollar value of unvested options $112,882 8390
Mean dollar value of vested options $143,117 8497
Total dollar value:  Mean $249,901 8656
                           Median $75,000 8656
% of pay:             Mean 183.7% 8403
                           Median 100.0% 8403
% of wealth:         Mean 60.3% 8104
                           Median 28.6% 8104
Any of above programs 44.9% 85.7% 2430 41206 